Morewood S. The British Defence of Egypt 1935-1940: Conflict and crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

New York: Frank Cass, 2005. — 274 + xviii p. — ISBN: 0–714–64943–0.Foreword
During the 1920s and 1930s the British Empire reached its greatest territorial extent, dwarfing the scale of any other empire and encompassing a quarter of the world. The lynchpin of that empire lay in Egypt where the Suez Canal provided the narrow but vital link between the key components of this geographically dispersed maritime giant. For all its importance, however, the role of Egypt in British policy during this period has either been neglected or dealt with superficially. Steven Morewood’s book breaks important new ground not only in our understanding of British policy in the eastern Mediterranean in the lead up to the Second World War, but also in addressing fundamental issues of strategy and policy, the nature of diplomatic-military relations, our understanding of the problems of policy formulation and decision making, the difficulties with sanctions, and the question of when, or when not, to use force.
From the time Napoleon and Nelson fought over the fate of Egypt, the eastern Mediterranean has attracted the rivalry of the world’s Great Powers. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, promising that this would be a temporary measure. In the four decades that followed, it repeated this pledge sixty-six more times. Various forms of Egyptian sovereignty were tried, but it was always Britain that played the dominant role. In the 1930s its position began to come under threat from a new rival, fascist Italy, with the Italian dictator, Mussolini, seemingly bent on the creation of his own regional empire.
The failure to block Mussolini’s assault on Abyssinia in 1935 is seen by many as the beginning of the road to the Second World War. Appeasement of Mussolini was undertaken largely because of the belief that in a war Italy could inflict severe damage on British forces. Mussolini’s bluster distorted British perceptions of the reality of Italian military power. This is a recurrent theme in international relations, when states take potential adversaries and inflate their real power to far in excess of the actuality. It would be the Greeks in 1940 who would call Mussolini’s bluff, taking the decisive action that had eluded the British Empire since 1935. One of the most fascinating aspects of this book is the tale of British perceptions of Italian power and how this shaped British decisions.List of maps
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction: defending Egypt in the era of appeasement
The lingering strategic significance of Egypt
The appeasement debate and Egypt
The nature of the Italian threat to Egypt
Sir Miles Lampson and the security of Egypt
The decision-making process
The British defence of Egypt in the interwar period: strategic imperatives and rationale
No surrender
The role of Egypt in imperial defence
The defence of Egypt and the onset of the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency
The emergence of the Italian threat
The origins of the Italo-Abyssinian Crisis: the Egyptian dimension
The British response to the growing Abyssinian
Crisis
The position in Egypt
Countdown to war
Defending Egypt during the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency: first phase, August-December 1935
Policy imperatives and dilemmas
Preparations for war
A clash of attitudes: the men on the spot and the Chiefs of Staff
The imperial defence dimension and the Hoare–Laval Pact
Defending Egypt during the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency: second phase, January-July 1936
The capacity to defend the Egyptian power base
Too far and too fast
An oil embargo: so near and yet so far
The Suez Canal closure issue
The end of the emergency
The making of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance: the military aspects
The background to negotiations
Commercing negotiations
The military negotiations
The finale
An assessment
Securing an exposed flank: the defence of Egypt in British diplomacy, June 1936-April 1938
The debate over the way forward
Defence planning priorities and Egypt
Assessing the Italian threat
From Eden’s resignation to the Easter Pact
‘Bloodless War’
The Egyptian dimension of the Munich Crisis
The aftermath
More harm than good: the Rome visit
Bloodless war begins
Preparing for war
Improving the intelligence picture
The approach of war in the Mediterranean
A summer of tension
Anglo-French incongruity
Preparing for battle
War comes closer
The onset of war
Implementing the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance: Anglo-Egyptian relations, 1937-1940
Implementing the Treaty: immediate achievements and complications
A changed leadership
Munich and after
The power struggle in Egypt
The lead up to war in Europe
Egypt stays out
The lead up to war in the Mediterranean
The removal of Ali Maher
The Suez Canal and the defence of the Far East, 1919-1940
The origins of the Suez Canal Defence Plan
The Suez Canal Defence Plan
The Suez Canal Defence Plan and interwar crises, 1937-1939
The advent of war in the Mediterranean
The Canal at war
Italo-German-Japanese motives for closing SuezNotes and references
Select bibliography