State University of New York Press, 2009. — 263 p.
Explores the distinctions between science and pseudoscience.
We live in a culture where science permeates virtually every aspect of our lives. Not only does it affect how we think about broad areas of research,
from star wars to the war on cancer, it has also invaded the most private part of our everyday lives. Science has shaped our views on everything
from what we should have for breakfast to how we should be raising our children to what our sex life should be like. Yet most people are woefully
ignorant of what distinguishes science from other types of knowledge and they lack any sense of the historical development of scientific ideas. Often
yesterday’s heresy is today’s science (and conversely today’s pseudoscience is yesterday’s science). This study uses four historical cases—sea serpent investigations, phrenology, and spiritualism, along with Darwin’s theory of evolution — to address issues of scientific marginality and legitimacy. This comparative approach illustrates that distinguishing between credible and doubtful conclusions in science is not as easy as the popular image of science tends to suggest. As David Knight has pointed out, science “is and always was based on a judicious mixture of empiricism and faith,” and thus, in the midst of discovery it is often difficult to distinguish what constitutes science from what does not.1 Therefore, the history of sciences that failed to become established has many lessons to teach us. Why do certain topics become subjects of scientific investigation at a particular moment in history? Why do some topics remain at the margins and others eventually become known as pseudoscience, while others grow and prosper, often spawning whole new disciplines? In fact, the distinction between science and pseudoscience is not sharp. The term “scientist” did not even exist until the middle of the nineteenth century. Rather than the term “pseudoscience,” which literally means false science, a more appropriate term to describe my case studies is “marginal” science. Each one attracted the interest of prominent scientists as well as the general public. Nevertheless, they all remained at the edges of scientific respectability. In contrast, evolutionary theory, while initially regarded as scientific heresy, rather quickly became the new scientific orthodoxy. The differing fates of each of these subjects are the topic of this book. Although these rather different episodes have aspects that are unique, certain common themes emerge. Each tells a complex story of professionalization as various disciplines emerged, each vying for power and authority. Social as well as cognitive factors played a significant role in the gathering and interpreting of evidence. “Facts” were used to support a variety of different positions, and ideas were often accepted with very little evidence, and held on to despite contradictory evidence. In spite of this, these episodes also illuminate how scientific practice has moved us to an ever increasingly accurate view of the material world. The final chapter explores why this is so and how the boundary disputes of the Victorian era have shaped the practice of science today. The production of scientific knowledge is embedded within a social, political, and historical matrix. However, rather than being a hindrance, that very intimate relationship between science and society contributes to the richness and diversity of scientific ideas. Examining two present-day controversies that are connected to the case studies illustrates that boundaries continue to be negotiated, and that disagreement and debate is essential to scientific progress.