Kirchin Simon (ed.) Thick Concepts

Oxford University Press, 2013. — 248 p. — (Mind Association Occasional). — ISBN-13 9780199672349.В чем разница между суждением о ком-то как о хорошем и суждением о том, что он добрый? Оба суждения, как правило, положительны, но последнее, кажется, предлагает более подробное описание человека: мы получаем более конкретное представление о том, на что они похожи. Очень общие оценочные понятия (такие как хороший, плохой, правильный и неправильный) называются тонкими понятиями, в то время как более конкретные (в том числе храбрый, грубый, добрый, злой, сочувствующий и подлый) называются толстыми понятиями.What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works.Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts
Thick Concepts, Analysis, and Reductionism
Practical Concepts
Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions
It’s Evaluation, Only Thicker
On the Nature and Signifi cance of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts
Disentangling Disentangling
Thick Concepts and Underdetermination
Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality
There Are No Thin Concepts
Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral Philosophy
Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action
Well-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of Labor between Moral Philosophy and Positive Psychology