Routledge, 2016. — 288 p.
When originally published in 1985 this volume was the first scholarly and objective contribution available on Rhodesian counter-insurgency. It documents and explains why Rhodesia lost the war. The origins of the conflict are reviewed; each chapter examines a separate institution or counter-insurgency strategy directly related to the development of the conflict, concluding with a summary view of the Rhodesian security situation both past and present. Without question, this is one of the best accounts of the overall Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategy (or lack thereof at times). The book covers a wide variety of topics including a general overview of the war, psychological and intelligence operations, protected village and cordon sanitaire tactics, Security Force Axillary operations, pseudo-operations of the Selous Scouts, and other aspects of the war. The book serves to give you a good account of the overall view straight away before it then delves into the specific aspects of how the war was fought.