Wheeler M. Reconstructing the Cognitive World. The next step

London; Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005. — 340 p. — ISBN 0-262-23240-5.Some years ago I published a paper called “From Robots to Rothko: theBringing Forth of Worlds.” It came in two versions. The first was alivewith new-doctoral-student revolutionary fervor; it was radical and confi-dent, but lacked a certain kind of philosophical rigor (Wheeler 1996a).The second presented a far more careful reworking of the arguments(Wheeler 1996b). These days I rather prefer the first version, but that’sneither here nor there. By building on a number of views that were verymuch in the cognitive-scientific air at the time, this paper, in both itsmanifestations, attempted to establish (i) that orthodox cognitive science(classical and connectionist) is committed to a generically Cartesianaccount of mind, (ii) that this Cartesian-ness is a problem, and (iii) thatan alternative, non-Cartesian cognitive science may be constructed byfusing together Heideggerian philosophy, an explanatory framework basedon dynamical systems theory, and various AI-related insights culledmostly from new forms of robotics. Whatever their respective merits, thetwo versions of “Robots to Rothko” shared a similar problem: they failedto make the case.What I thought I needed was more space. My doctoral thesis (Wheeler1996c) gave me that, and, indeed, that work does, I hope, constitute a fuller and more powerful exploration of the ideas. However, I knew thatsignificant problems remained. What I really needed, of course, was moretime: time to develop my interpretations of Descartes’s and Heidegger’sphilosophical frameworks; time to work through, in proper detail, thevarious issues and arguments raised by my project (especially those concerning the nature and status of representation); time to understandthe complications presented by the proposed alternative view; and time toallow some of the then-new species of empirical work on which I wasdrawing (e.g., evolutionary robotics) to reach scientific maturity. It seems
that striking while the iron is lukewarm is sometimes the best strategy inphilosophy.This book presents the fruits of such a strike. In the intervening yearsthe overall argument and the final position have been significantly trans-formed—along some dimensions, beyond all recognition. Of course, per-sonal history is of limited interest: it is extremely unlikely that mostreaders of this book will have read “Robots to Rothko” or (even less likely)my doctoral thesis. However, with respect to the super brief summary ofmy earlier view as given in (i)–(iii) above, I should perhaps say that thereis now an important (albeit ring-fenced) place for orthodox (Cartesian)cognitive-scientific thinking within the final framework on offer, and thatthe proposed relationship between Heideggerian philosophy and theongoing reconstruction of cognitive science is now far more subtle. Ihope, however, that my attempt to work things out in a way that is philosophically and scientifically more compelling has not led to all therevolutionary zeal and energy of that new doctoral student being sacrificed.Setting the Scene
Clank, Whirr, Cognition: Descartes on Minds and Machines
Descartes’s Ghost: The Haunting of Cognitive Science
Explaining the Behavior of Springs, Pendulums, and Cognizers
Being Over There: Beginning a Heideggerian Adventure
Being-In with the In-Crowd
Doorknobs and Monads
Out of Our Heads
Heideggerian Reflections
It’s Not a Threat, It’s an Opportunity
A Re-Beginning: It’s Cognitive Science, But Not as We Know It283