Loyn D. The Long War. The Inside Story of America and Afghanistan Since 9/11

St. Martin’s Press, 2021. — 477 p.Just as U. S. soldiers and diplomats pulled out of Afghanistan, supposedly concluding their role and responsibility in the two-decade conflict, the country fell to the Taliban. In The Long War, award-winning BBC foreign correspondent David Loyn uncovers the political and military strategies―and failures―that prolonged America’s longest war. Three American presidents tried to defeat the Taliban―sending 150,000 international troops at the war’s peak with a trillion-dollar price tag. But early policy mistakes that allowed Osama bin Laden to escape made the task far more difficult. Deceived by easy victories, they backed ruthless corrupt local allies and misspent aid. The story of The Long War is told by the generals who led it through the hardest years of combat as surges of international troops tried to turn the tide. Generals, which include David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, Joe Dunford and John Allen, were tested in battle as never before. With the reputation of a “warrior monk,” McChrystal was considered one of the most gifted military leaders of his generation. He was one of two generals to be fired in this most public of commands. Holding together the coalition of countries who joined America’s fight in Afghanistan was just one part of the multi-dimensional puzzle faced by the generals, as they fought an elusive and determined enemy while responsible for thousands of young American and allied lives. The Long War goes behind the scenes of their command and of the Afghan government. The fourth president to take on the war, Joe Biden ordered troops to withdraw in 2021, twenty years after 9/11, just as the Taliban achieved victory, leaving behind an unstable nation and an unforeseeable future.Victory was an illusion. Airpower did most of the work in defeating the Taliban, with only a small number of special operations forces in support on the ground, but with no follow-up. General David Petraeus saw this as the founding mistake of the war. “We had not fully exploited the considerable opportunities available in the early years after the invasion in late 2001, before the Taliban and other insurgent and extremist elements regrouped, and returned to Afghanistan, while maintaining sanctuaries in Pakistan. And after they began to return, we always seemed to be shooting behind the target.” After the initial operation, the main aim of the war remained the pursuit of the remnants of al-Qaeda, rather than securing Afghanistan. Just as in Iraq two years later, when the country imploded as the U.S. did not replace Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus with anything in the early months, so in Afghanistan there was a naive belief that somehow, with the Taliban out of the way, order would emerge. The policy was a fundamental mistake and prolonged the war by many years. There could have been a different outcome with a larger international force at the start, with zero tolerance of corruption, configured to hold the line and prevent the return of the warlords, and not resistant to nation-building. But neither America nor the allies who rallied round its flag after 9/11 had the capacity, will, knowledge, or forces to fill the gap long enough to stabilize a country.Table of ContentsDedication
Maps
Introduction
Phase One 2001-2006: The Die is Cast
Not Building A Nation
The Fog of AidPhase Two 2006–2009: The Taliban Return
The Biggest Warlord
The Heart of the Beast
Rack ’em and Stack ’emPhase Three 2009–2011: The Surge
Coin
Obama’s War
Owning the Villages
The Bell Curve and the Anaconda
The Counterinsurgency DilemmaPhase Four 2011–2014: Drawdown
Pivot Point
Triple Transition
Talking to the Taliban IPhase Five 2015–2021: Endgame
Afghanistan’s War
Enduring Commitment
Talking to the Taliban II
Election and AfterPhotographs
Acknowledgments
Picture Credits
Bibliography
Notes
Index
About the Author
Copyright